GM dérape vers la faillite

[Atze]

Merci pour le vidéo MTLskyline. Mais il a vraisemblablement été produit par et pour les intérêts des grand manufacturiers américains. Ce n'est pas parce que un ou les trois cessent leurs activités que les américains n'achèteront plus de voitures. Par contre, il est très probable qu'une plus grande partie de ces véhicules soient fabriqués à l'extérieur des É-U.

 

Ceci étant dit, je suis pour une aide rapide et importante aux constructeurs qui en feront la demande. Cet aide devra par contre s'accompagner de conditions bien précises, entre autre au niveau de la rémunération des dirigeants, de l'amélioration de la productivité des activités de fabrication (quitte à délocaliser certaines activités) et surtout de l'imposition de normes plus sévères quant à la performance et à la consommation de ces véhicules.

 

Les États-Unis ne cessent de répéter que pour leur sécurité national ils doivent sécuriser des sources d'approvisionnement de pétrole, mais jamais on entent parler d'améliorer l'utilisation et de la réduction de la consommation de ce pétrole dans des secteurs où il y a une place immense à l'amélioration. Le prix du pétrole redescend en ce moment, ce qui selon moi n'augure vraiment rien de bon, un pétrole à prix plus bas = moins de recherche de nouvelles sources d'approvisionnement = gros gros problèmes quand l'économie va prendre du mieux et que tous le monde va se remettre à consommer plus intensément.

[cjb]

A short video outlining what will happen if the domestic auto industry collapses. Some of you seem to be cheering on their demise. Be careful what you wish for.

 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72cHfOKoA1c

 

un vidéo de propagande somme toute mensonger.

si les constructeurs font faillite, certaines usines seront rachetées par des constructeurs asiatiques.

il n'y aura pas une disparition de l'industrie.

seulement des compagnies.

[Atze]

Why Bankruptcy Is the Best Option for GM

 

Wall Street Journal

NOVEMBER 17, 2008

By MICHAEL E. LEVINE

 

General Motors is a once-great company caught in a web of relationships designed for another era. It should not be fed while still caught, because that will leave it trapped until we get tired of feeding it. Then it will die. The only possibility of saving it is to take the risk of cutting it free. In other words, GM should be allowed to go bankrupt.

 

Consider the costs of tackling GM's problems with some kind of bailout plan. After 42 years of eroding U.S. market share (from 53% to 20%) and countless announcements of "change," GM still has eight U.S. brands (Cadillac, Saab, Buick, Pontiac, GMC, Saturn, Chevrolet and Hummer). As for its more successful competitors, Toyota (19% market share) has three, and Honda (11%) has two.

 

GM has about 7,000 dealers. Toyota has fewer than 1,500. Honda has about 1,000. These fewer and larger dealers are better able to advertise, stock and service the cars they sell. GM knows it needs fewer brands and dealers, but the dealers are protected from termination by state laws. This makes eliminating them and the brands they sell very expensive. It would cost GM billions of dollars and many years to reduce the number of dealers it has to a number near Toyota's.

 

 

Foreign-owned manufacturers who build cars with American workers pay wages similar to GM's. But their expenses for benefits are a fraction of GM's. GM is contractually required to support thousands of workers in the UAW's "Jobs Bank" program, which guarantees nearly full wages and benefits for workers who lose their jobs due to automation or plant closure. It supports more retirees than current workers. It owns or leases enormous amounts of property for facilities it's not using and probably will never use again, and is obliged to support revenue bonds for municipalities that issued them to build these facilities. It has other contractual obligations such as health coverage for union retirees. All of these commitments drain its cash every month. Moreover, GM supports myriad suppliers and supports a huge infrastructure of firms and localities that depend on it. Many of them have contractual claims; they all have moral claims. They all want GM to be more or less what it is.

 

And therein lies the problem: The cost of terminating dealers is only a fraction of what it would cost to rebuild GM to become a company sized and marketed appropriately for its market share. Contracts would have to be bought out. The company would have to shed many of its fixed obligations. Some obligations will be impossible to cut by voluntary agreement. GM will run out of cash and out of time.

 

GM's solution is to ask the federal government for the cash that will allow it to do all of this piece by piece. But much of the cash will be thrown at unproductive commitments. And the sense of urgency that would enable GM to make choices painful to its management, its workers, its retirees, its suppliers and its localities will simply not be there if federal money is available. Like AIG, it will be back for more, and at the same time it will be telling us that it's doing a great job under difficult circumstances.

 

Federal law provides a way out of the web: reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. If GM were told that no assistance would be available without a bankruptcy filing, all options would be put on the table. The web could be cut wherever it needed to be. State protection for dealers would disappear. Labor contracts could be renegotiated. Pension plans could be terminated, with existing pensions turned over to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC). Health benefits could be renegotiated. Mortgaged assets could be abandoned, so plants could be closed without being supported as idle hindrances on GM's viability. GM could be rebuilt as a company that had a chance to make vehicles people want and support itself on revenue. It wouldn't be easy but, unlike trying to bail out GM as it is, it wouldn't be impossible.

 

The social and political costs would be very large, but if GM fails after getting $50 billion or $100 billion in bailout money, it'll be just as large and there will be less money to soften the blow and even more blame to go around. The PBGC will probably need money to guarantee GM's pensions for its white- and blue-collar workers (pension support is capped at around $40,000 per year, so that won't help executives much). Unemployment insurance will have to be extended and offered to many people, perhaps millions if you include dealers, suppliers and communities dependent on GM as it exists now. A GM bankruptcy will make addressing health-care coverage more urgent, which is probably a good thing. It would require job-retraining money and community assistance to affected localities.

 

But unless we are willing to support GM as it is indefinitely, the downsizing and asset-shedding will have to come anyway. Even if it builds cars as attractive and environmentally responsible as those Honda and Toyota will be building, they won't be able to carry the weight of GM's past.

 

GM CEO Rick Wagoner says "bankruptcy is not an option." Critics of a bankruptcy say that GM won't be able to get the loans it will need to guarantee warranties, pay its operating losses while it restructures, and preserve customers' ability to finance purchases. While consumers buy tickets from bankrupt airlines, electronics from bankrupt retailers, and apartments from bankrupt builders, they say consumers won't buy cars from a bankrupt auto maker. But bankruptcy no longer means "liquidation" or "out of business" to a generation of consumers used to buying from firms in reorganization.

 

GM would guarantee warranty support with a segregated fund if necessary. And debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing -- loans that provide the near-term cash for reorganizing companies -- is very safe, because the DIP lender has priority over all other claimants. In normal markets, it would certainly be available to a GM that has assets to sell, including a viable overseas business. Such financing is probably available even now.

 

In any event, it would be lined up before a filing, not after, so any problems wouldn't be a surprise. As a last resort, we could at least consider a public DIP loan to support a reorganizing GM with a good chance to survive -- as opposed to subsidizing a GM slowly deflating.

 

The fate of Daewoo -- the Korean auto maker that collapsed in 2000 after filing for bankruptcy, leaving about 500 dealers stranded in the U.S. -- is often cited as "proof" that a GM bankruptcy won't work. But Daewoo was headquartered in a part of the world where bankruptcy still carries a major stigma and usually means liquidation. Daewoo's experience is largely irrelevant to a major U.S. company undergoing a well-publicized positive transformation, almost certainly under new management.

 

GM as it is cannot survive without long-term government life support. If it gets that support, it can't change enough and won't change fast enough. Contrary to Mr. Wagoner's brave declaration, bankruptcy is an option. In fact, it's the only option that merits public support and actually has a chance at succeeding.

 

Mr. Levine, a former airline executive, is a distinguished research scholar and senior lecturer at NYU School of Law.

[ErickMontreal]

Services financiers Chrysler ferme 3 bureaux

 

18 novembre 2008 - 16h21

Presse Canadienne

 

La filiale financière de Chrysler Canada a annoncé mardi la fermeture de trois bureaux dans le but de consolider ses activités à Toronto, une décision qui touchera 145 travailleurs.

 

Services financiers Chrysler fermera immédiatement son centre d'affaires de Calgary, tandis que ceux de Montréal et de Windsor, en Ontario, fermeront leurs portes d'ici la fin avril 2009.

Certains des travailleurs touchés par cette décision se sont fait offrir d'être relocalisés.

 

Selon le président et directeur général, Gino Cozza, les six derniers mois ont été «extrêmement difficiles» pour Services financiers Chrysler, qui dessert les concessionnaires et leurs clients.

 

Chrysler a été durement touché par la récente chute des ventes de véhicules automobiles aux États-Unis, le resserrement des marchés du crédit et le ralentissement économique généralisé.

[ErickMontreal]

Une faillite du «Big 3» dévastatrice pour le Canada, principalement pour l`Ontario

 

18 novembre 2008 - 15h56

Agence France-Presse

 

Une faillite des grands de l'automobile américains serait «dévastatrice» pour l'économie canadienne, a averti mardi le chef du syndicat des travailleurs de l'automobile, en appelant Washington et Ottawa à venir en aide au secteur.

 

La faillite d'un des trois grands de Detroit (General Motors, Ford et Chrysler) «serait un coup dévastateur pour l'économie, pour les consommateurs et franchement pour nos membres aussi», a déclaré Ken Lewenza, président du syndicat des travailleurs canadiens de l'automobile à la chaîne CTV.

 

Sa mise en garde est intervenue au moment où les dirigeants des trois grands plaidaient leur cause devant la commission bancaire du Sénat américain pour tenter d'obtenir une nouvelle rallonge de 25 G$ d'argent public dont dépend leur survie.

 

«On ne peut même pas imaginer les conséquences dans des communautés comme Oshawa ou Windsor (...) qui sont dominées par l'automobile», a-t-il dit.

 

La veille, M. Lewenza avait déclaré au quotidien The National Post que ses membres n'entendaient pas faire de concessions supplémentaires pour sortir d'une crise qu'il n'ont pas créée.

 

Le gouvernement canadien étudie un éventuel plan d'aide à l'industrie automobile, mais a souligné qu'il en était encore au stade de la «collecte d'informations».

 

Le ministre de l'Industrie Tony Clement a indiqué qu'il comptait se rendre à Detroit et à Washington dans les prochains jours pour des discussions exploratoires avec des représentants de l'industrie et des membres du Congrès.

 

Il doit être accompagné du ministre du Développement économique de la province d'Ontario Michael Bryant.

 

Quelque 130 000 emplois sont liés à la fabrication d'automobiles ou de pièces détachées dans la province d'Ontario, la plus peuplée du Canada. Ce secteur représente 38% des exportations de la province.

 

Environ 90% des véhicules assemblés au Canada sont exportés aux États-Unis, de même que plus de 65% des pièces détachées.

[MTLskyline]

Une faillite du «Big 3» dévastatrice pour le Canada, principalement pour l`Ontario

 

18 novembre 2008 - 15h56

Agence France-Presse

 

Une faillite des grands de l'automobile américains serait «dévastatrice» pour l'économie canadienne, a averti mardi le chef du syndicat des travailleurs de l'automobile, en appelant Washington et Ottawa à venir en aide au secteur.

 

La faillite d'un des trois grands de Detroit (General Motors, Ford et Chrysler) «serait un coup dévastateur pour l'économie, pour les consommateurs et franchement pour nos membres aussi», a déclaré Ken Lewenza, président du syndicat des travailleurs canadiens de l'automobile à la chaîne CTV.

 

Sa mise en garde est intervenue au moment où les dirigeants des trois grands plaidaient leur cause devant la commission bancaire du Sénat américain pour tenter d'obtenir une nouvelle rallonge de 25 G$ d'argent public dont dépend leur survie.

 

«On ne peut même pas imaginer les conséquences dans des communautés comme Oshawa ou Windsor (...) qui sont dominées par l'automobile», a-t-il dit.

 

La veille, M. Lewenza avait déclaré au quotidien The National Post que ses membres n'entendaient pas faire de concessions supplémentaires pour sortir d'une crise qu'il n'ont pas créée.

 

Le gouvernement canadien étudie un éventuel plan d'aide à l'industrie automobile, mais a souligné qu'il en était encore au stade de la «collecte d'informations».

 

Le ministre de l'Industrie Tony Clement a indiqué qu'il comptait se rendre à Detroit et à Washington dans les prochains jours pour des discussions exploratoires avec des représentants de l'industrie et des membres du Congrès.

 

Il doit être accompagné du ministre du Développement économique de la province d'Ontario Michael Bryant.

 

Quelque 130 000 emplois sont liés à la fabrication d'automobiles ou de pièces détachées dans la province d'Ontario, la plus peuplée du Canada. Ce secteur représente 38% des exportations de la province.

 

Environ 90% des véhicules assemblés au Canada sont exportés aux États-Unis, de même que plus de 65% des pièces détachées.

Il y a des vérités dans ce qu'il dit, mais c'est quand même le chef du CAW. Les sydicats sont une très partie du problème. (les travailleurs américains dans les compagnies Japonaises n'ont pas de syndicats!)

[Malek]

Toyota lève le pied

 

Mise à jour le mercredi 19 novembre 2008 à 6 h 22

 

 

Des Japonais à la recherche d'un véhicule chez un concessionnaire Toyota.

 

Le fabricant automobile japonais Toyota arrêtera la production dans toutes ces usines au Canada et aux États-Unis pour deux jours le mois prochain pour faire face à la baisse de ses ventes.

 

 

Cette décision touche les 11 usines spécialisées dans l'assemblage de véhicules et la fabrication de moteurs. Toyota précise que les employés iront tout de même au travail les 22 et 23 décembre.

 

L'entreprise japonaise voudrait ainsi limiter la croissance de son inventaire sans toutefois préciser l'impact qu'aura cette décision sur la production.

En 2007, l'ensemble des usines de Toyota en Amérique du Nord et excluant le Mexique a produit 1,6 million de véhicules.

 

Les fabricants automobiles aux États-Unis subissent l'impact de la crise financière qui a des répercussions dans d'autres secteurs de l'économie. Les dépenses de consommateurs représentent les trois quarts de la croissance américaine. Les ventes du géant japonais de l'automobile ont baissé de 25,9 % en octobre dernier aux États-Unis comparativement à la même période il y a un an.

 

Radio-Canada.ca avec

Agence France Presse

[ErickMontreal]

Let Detroit Go Bankrupt

 

 

Article Tools Sponsored By

By MITT ROMNEY

Published: November 18, 2008

 

 

IF General Motors, Ford and Chrysler get the bailout that their chief executives asked for yesterday, you can kiss the American automotive industry goodbye. It won’t go overnight, but its demise will be virtually guaranteed.

 

Without that bailout, Detroit will need to drastically restructure itself. With it, the automakers will stay the course — the suicidal course of declining market shares, insurmountable labor and retiree burdens, technology atrophy, product inferiority and never-ending job losses. Detroit needs a turnaround, not a check.

 

I love cars, American cars. I was born in Detroit, the son of an auto chief executive. In 1954, my dad, George Romney, was tapped to run American Motors when its president suddenly died. The company itself was on life support — banks were threatening to deal it a death blow. The stock collapsed. I watched Dad work to turn the company around — and years later at business school, they were still talking about it. From the lessons of that turnaround, and from my own experiences, I have several prescriptions for Detroit’s automakers.

 

First, their huge disadvantage in costs relative to foreign brands must be eliminated. That means new labor agreements to align pay and benefits to match those of workers at competitors like BMW, Honda, Nissan and Toyota. Furthermore, retiree benefits must be reduced so that the total burden per auto for domestic makers is not higher than that of foreign producers.

 

That extra burden is estimated to be more than $2,000 per car. Think what that means: Ford, for example, needs to cut $2,000 worth of features and quality out of its Taurus to compete with Toyota’s Avalon. Of course the Avalon feels like a better product — it has $2,000 more put into it. Considering this disadvantage, Detroit has done a remarkable job of designing and engineering its cars. But if this cost penalty persists, any bailout will only delay the inevitable.

 

Second, management as is must go. New faces should be recruited from unrelated industries — from companies widely respected for excellence in marketing, innovation, creativity and labor relations.

 

The new management must work with labor leaders to see that the enmity between labor and management comes to an end. This division is a holdover from the early years of the last century, when unions brought workers job security and better wages and benefits. But as Walter Reuther, the former head of the United Automobile Workers, said to my father, “Getting more and more pay for less and less work is a dead-end street.”

 

You don’t have to look far for industries with unions that went down that road. Companies in the 21st century cannot perpetuate the destructive labor relations of the 20th. This will mean a new direction for the U.A.W., profit sharing or stock grants to all employees and a change in Big Three management culture.

 

The need for collaboration will mean accepting sanity in salaries and perks. At American Motors, my dad cut his pay and that of his executive team, he bought stock in the company, and he went out to factories to talk to workers directly. Get rid of the planes, the executive dining rooms — all the symbols that breed resentment among the hundreds of thousands who will also be sacrificing to keep the companies afloat.

 

Investments must be made for the future. No more focus on quarterly earnings or the kind of short-term stock appreciation that means quick riches for executives with options. Manage with an eye on cash flow, balance sheets and long-term appreciation. Invest in truly competitive products and innovative technologies — especially fuel-saving designs — that may not arrive for years. Starving research and development is like eating the seed corn.

 

Just as important to the future of American carmakers is the sales force. When sales are down, you don’t want to lose the only people who can get them to grow. So don’t fire the best dealers, and don’t crush them with new financial or performance demands they can’t meet.

 

It is not wrong to ask for government help, but the automakers should come up with a win-win proposition. I believe the federal government should invest substantially more in basic research — on new energy sources, fuel-economy technology, materials science and the like — that will ultimately benefit the automotive industry, along with many others. I believe Washington should raise energy research spending to $20 billion a year, from the $4 billion that is spent today. The research could be done at universities, at research labs and even through public-private collaboration. The federal government should also rectify the imbedded tax penalties that favor foreign carmakers.

 

But don’t ask Washington to give shareholders and bondholders a free pass — they bet on management and they lost.

 

The American auto industry is vital to our national interest as an employer and as a hub for manufacturing. A managed bankruptcy may be the only path to the fundamental restructuring the industry needs. It would permit the companies to shed excess labor, pension and real estate costs. The federal government should provide guarantees for post-bankruptcy financing and assure car buyers that their warranties are not at risk.

 

In a managed bankruptcy, the federal government would propel newly competitive and viable automakers, rather than seal their fate with a bailout check.

[cjb]

exactement ce qu'il faut. les gens qui proposent une aide gouvernementale ne propose aucune solution.

 

ça serait comme donner un peu de drogue à un drogué au bord du suicide.

[Habsfan]

First, their huge disadvantage in costs relative to foreign brands must be eliminated. That means new labor agreements to align pay and benefits to match those of workers at competitors like BMW, Honda, Nissan and Toyota. Furthermore, retiree benefits must be reduced so that the total burden per auto for domestic makers is not higher than that of foreign producers.

 

That extra burden is estimated to be more than $2,000 per car. Think what that means: Ford, for example, needs to cut $2,000 worth of features and quality out of its Taurus to compete with Toyota’s Avalon. Of course the Avalon feels like a better product — it has $2,000 more put into it. Considering this disadvantage, Detroit has done a remarkable job of designing and engineering its cars. But if this cost penalty persists, any bailout will only delay the inevitable.

 

J'ai bien aimé cet article. Le Gars a raison, mais ce qu,il propose n'arrivera pas...c'est trop drastique comme changement!