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Found 151 results

  1. brubru

    Pointe-du-Moulin

    Bonjour, Aujourd'hui j'ai fait un peu de photoshop sur le cas du silo no 5, voici le résultat Avant Après Crédit photo: http://lesbeautesdemontreal.wordpress.com Étapes de réalisation du projet: Démolition de tout les silos, sauf celui le plus récent Enlever tout les anciennes composantes qui servaient au silo Nouvelle utilisation : Observatoire Vue du toit: Crédit photo: http://www.havremontreal.qc.ca Je ne sais pas si ça serait mieux qu'il soit au béton ou peinturé d'un couleur... Je vais faire des plans du toit et du terrain. Le bas pourrait devenir la gare des trams !
  2. Les activités de janvier et février furent difficiles à cause du retrait de la ligne de crédit de l'entreprise. Pour en lire plus...
  3. Un sondage indique que 41% des détaillants disent avoir de plus de difficulté à obtenir du crédit, les institutions de prêts ayant considérablement resserré leurs critères pour obtenir un emprunt. Pour en lire plus...
  4. Le budget fédéral donnera à Ottawa le pouvoir d'intervenir lorsque des sociétés émettrices de cartes de crédit imposeront des augmentations de taux à leur clientèle. Pour en lire plus...
  5. Le crédit commence à se faire rare, ce qui fait mal à l'avionneur brésilien. En raison de la volatilité de la conjoncture financière, Embraer n'a pas voulu faire de prévisions pour 2010. Pour en lire plus...
  6. La Banque de Montréal est exposée à hauteur de 51 G$ tandis que l'exposition de la Banque TD a été estimée à 46 G$, estime un analyste. Pour en lire plus...
  7. Depuis l'éclatement de la crise du crédit l'été dernier, les épargnants ont laissé beaucoup d'argent dormir dans leur compte. Pour en lire plus...
  8. Bien des retraités n’y ont vu que du feu, mais la crise du crédit a nui à leur régime de retraite depuis un an. Pour en lire plus...
  9. Le géant américain du crédit immobilier Fannie Mae a annoncé lundi qu'il allait probablement demander 11 à 16 milliards $ d'aide au gouvernement fédéral. Pour en lire plus...
  10. La banque centrale des États-Unis a annoncé lundi qu'elle augmentait de 330 G$ US les lignes de crédit qu'elle accorde aux autres banques centrales du monde entier. Pour en lire plus...
  11. L'ex-premier ministre Paul Martin prédit que l'actuelle crise du crédit qui ébranle les États-Unis mènera à une réforme attendue du Fonds monétaire international. Pour en lire plus...
  12. La Cour suprême du Canada a annoncé vendredi qu'elle refusait d'entendre la demande d'appel présentée par le groupe d'investisseurs qui conteste le plan de restructuration des 32 milliards $ de papier commercial adossé à des actifs (PCAA), un type de placement gelé depuis l'éclosion de la crise du crédit, il y a un an. Pour en lire plus...
  13. Le resserrement du crédit aux États-Unis frappe durement les concessionnaires de voitures dont une grande partie des ventes se fait grâce aux prêts automobiles. Pour en lire plus...
  14. Le gouvernement achètera d'ici la fin de l'année financière des blocs additionnels de prêts assurés à concurrence de 50 G$ pour faciliter la circulation du crédit. Pour en lire plus...
  15. Les facilités de crédits d'urgence de la Fed pour les firmes d'investissements sont couvertes par la décision. Pour en lire plus...
  16. Le gouverneur de la Banque du Canada, Mark Carney, demande aux institutions financières canadiennes de faire leur part pour résoudre la crise en évitant de restreindre l'accès au crédit. Pour en lire plus...
  17. http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2012/04/15/fashion/20120415-FORAGING.html For decades, period architecture and pristine cobblestone streets have kept Old Montreal well trodden by tourists. But this gracious waterfront area, dating back centuries, is regaining cachet with locals, and high-end retail has followed. A western stretch of narrow Rue St. Paul, where souvenir shops once hawked Québécois kitsch, has become an unlikely hub for high fashion. Huge picture windows in restored stone buildings now showcase of-the-moment looks to rival the hippest that New York or Paris have to offer — all with an insouciant Montreal twist. — MICHAEL KAMINER Credit: Yannick Grandmont for The New York Times
  18. Ils se sont entendus pour former un groupe ayant pour mandat d'assurer la disponibilité du crédit et du financement. Pour en lire plus...
  19. Dans le tourbillon de consommation des Fêtes, l'utilisation de la carte de crédit n'est pas sans risque. Pour en lire plus...
  20. Publié le 19 février 2009 à 05h10 | Mis à jour à 05h10 La crise frappe, les PPP vacillent André Noël La Presse Résultat de la crise financière: les projets de partenariat public-privé (PPP) vacillent un peu partout dans le monde, les banques hésitant à consentir des prêts aux entreprises impliquées, sauf à des taux d'intérêt élevés, indique un rapport récent de la firme PriceWaterhouseCoopers. De grandes sociétés étrangères qui participent aux deux consortiums présélectionnés pour construire le Centre hospitalier de l'Université de Montréal en PPP connaissent d'ailleurs des difficultés d'accès au crédit, ce qui pourrait retarder le lancement des appels de propositions, a constaté La Presse. «Les marchés du crédit sont presque à sec», explique Richard Abadie, responsable des infrastructures chez PriceWaterhouseCoopers, une firme bien connue pour son expertise en PPP, dans un rapport intitulé Financement des infrastructures - survivre au resserrement du crédit. «Les prévisions à court terme demeurent sombres. Peu de projets (en PPP) seront conclus. Plusieurs d'entre eux ont déjà été mis sur la glace, ajoute le rapport, publié en décembre. Le crédit bancaire est simplement insuffisant, et inefficace, comme source de financement à long terme (...) Il est naïf de s'attendre à ce que les marchés reviennent aux bas taux de financement obtenus pendant le premier semestre de 2007.» Dans le mode conventionnel, les gouvernements empruntent l'argent pour construire des immeubles ou des infrastructures. Ce modèle domine toujours dans la plupart des pays. Le modèle des PPP a émergé il y a quelques années: une compagnie ou un consortium contracte les emprunts, finance la construction du bâtiment, puis le loue au gouvernement. Les partisans des PPP, comme la ministre des Finances Monique Jérôme-Forget, soutiennent que le gouvernement transfère les risques financiers à l'entreprise privé en agissant de la sorte. S'il y a un dépassement de coûts dans la construction, c'est l'entreprise qui écope et pas le gouvernement, affirment-ils. Mais avec la crise, les banques hésitent à prêter aux entreprises privées. En revanche, elles n'hésitent pas à prêter aux gouvernements. Les gouvernements obtiennent des taux d'intérêt beaucoup plus bas que les entreprises. Dans ce contexte, la construction revient beaucoup plus chère en PPP qu'en mode conventionnel. Des consortiums se sont engagés dans les PPP en faisant des emprunts à court terme, et en croyant pouvoir se refinancer à des taux d'intérêt relativement bas lorsqu'ils commenceraient à toucher les loyers. Mais aujourd'hui, ils éprouvent beaucoup de difficultés à renouveler leurs emprunts sans augmenter les paiements d'intérêt. «Ils pourraient faire face à des paiements de dette plus élevés que prévus, ou même être incapables de se refinancer», prévient le rapport de PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Le mois dernier, La Presse a révélé que la société australienne Babcock and Brown, membre du consortium Accès Santé CHUM, a vu sa situation se détériorer à un tel point que ses actions ont été suspendues en Bourse. Cette entreprise est aussi membre d'un consortium pour la construction en PPP de la salle de concert de l'Orchestre symphonique de Montréal. Ce n'est pas tout. La société espagnole Acciona, qui s'occupe elle aussi de l'ingénierie financière dans le même consortium pour le CHUM, a un taux d'endettement plutôt inquiétant. Cette firme a également emporté l'appel de propositions pour le prolongement de l'autoroute 30 en mode PPP. «Ce groupe est aujourd'hui aux abois, note le journal financier français Les Échos dans son numéro d'hier. Sous la pression de ses banques, qui s'inquiètent de son endettement, Acciona va sans doute être contraint de céder sa participation (dans un groupe énergétique).» Début février, Acciona s'est elle-même plainte que «le marché (est) complexe, avec un accès très limité au crédit». La société anglaise Innisfree, qui s'occupe de l'ingénierie financière dans le deuxième consortium présélectionné pour le CHUM, vient d'appeler le gouvernement britannique à l'aide pour sauver les PPP au Royaume-Uni, considéré comme le pays-modèle en cette matière par la ministre Jérôme-Forget. Dimanche dernier, Tim Pearson, directeur d'Innisfree et porte-parole du Forum sur les PPP en Grande-Bretagne, a indiqué que les sociétés privées avaient besoin de l'aide de l'État pour assurer le financement qui aurait dû être fourni par des prêts commerciaux. Selon lui, l'État britannique devrait consentir une aide de 4 milliards de livres pour sauver les projets en PPP. Le nombre de contrats en PPP signés en Grande-Bretagne l'année dernière est le plus bas depuis 11 ans. Un contrat pour une route de 11 milles a été signé en janvier 2009, mais la moitié du financement est assurée par une banque du secteur public. John Tizard, directeur du Centre pour les partenariats en services publics de l'Université de Birmingham, affirme que les banques n'ont plus d'argent pour les hôpitaux britanniques en PPP. Il suggère de revenir au mode de construction conventionnel qui, selon lui, se révèle moins coûteux et plus rapide à réaliser. Ici même, au Canada, le vérificateur général de l'Ontario vient de souligner que le premier hôpital construit en PPP dans la province a coûté 50 millions de plus que si le gouvernement l'avait réalisé en mode conventionnel, sans partenaire privé.
  21. Les 3500 concessionnaires d'autos du Canada, dont les 850 du Québec, dénoncent la frilosité des banques qui leur ferment le robinet du crédit. Pour en lire plus...
  22. Nouveau projet Accès condo à Lachine - Mise en vente le 12 mars 2011 120 unités, réparties sur 6 étages 1cc à partir de 139 000 $ - 13 900 $ (crédit d'achat de 10%) = 125 100 $ taxes incluses 2cc à partir de 200 000 $ - 20 000 $ (crédit d'achat 10%) = 180 000 $ taxes incluses 3cc à partir de 227 900 $ - 22 790 $ (crédit d'achat 10%) = 205 110 $ taxes incluses [/img] http://www.shdm.org/acces_condos/fr/projet_fiche.php?projet_id=174
  23. April 29, 2009 By LANDON THOMAS Jr. LONDON — Tetsuya Ishikawa reaped the fruits of London’s financial boom, structuring and selling his small share of the complex securities that fueled both his professional rise and the uninterrupted economic growth of Britain. When the boom went bust last year, he lost his job at Morgan Stanley, along with about 28,000 other Londoners working in finance. Mr. Ishikawa, who has written a fictional memoir, has no plans to return to the City, as London’s banking district is known. But Britain’s revenue-starved Labor government will find no such escape. “By 2010, the U.K. will have the largest budget deficit in the developed world,” said Richard Snook, a senior economist at the Center for Economic and Business Research in London. “The problem is that the financial services industry has been a huge cash cow for the British government for the last 10 years and now it is going into reverse.” The country’s budget deficit has soared to 12 percent of gross domestic product; its public debt burden could soon reach 80 percent of annual economic output, a figure that would leave it roughly in the same position as Greece. But at a time when Britain more than ever needs a financial sector firing on all cylinders, its economic engine is conking out — for a number of reasons, including some that critics blame on the government. All told, more than 70,000 jobs in finance are expected to disappear over the next two to three years, a big chunk of the total estimated job losses of about 280,000 in London. The British government has poured hundreds of billions of pounds into preventing several of its largest banks from falling into bankruptcy as the extent of their bad bets became evident. But there is little prospect of a revival anytime soon, as the government is about to impose stiffer demands on banks to keep high capital ratios and to rely less on leverage and once-lucrative trading activities. That, combined with a more aggressive posture by the regulatory authorities to put a check on bonuses, is likely to hasten what has already been a sharp falloff in corporate and income taxes from the City. The economic contribution from the British financial sector, according to the Office for National Statistics, peaked at 10.8 percent of G.D.P. in 2007 — up from 5.5 percent in 1996, just before Labor took over. By comparison, the contribution from financial services in the United States to the American economy never exceeded 8 percent. In a bid to capture more revenue, the British government has decided to raise tax rates on the affluent, many of them working in finance. But the new top income tax rate of 50 percent for those earning at least £150,000, or $219,000, may only make things worse, said Mr. Snook, the economist. “These people are highly mobile and they will leave London,” he said. “The impact on public finances will be negative.” Britain’s top tax rate will soon rank fourth behind those of Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands — not quite the advertisement one would expect from one of the world’s leading financial centers. In many ways, Mr. Ishikawa’s career tracked the credit explosion that has now imploded. When he began work as a lowly credit analyst in 2002, banks in London issued about £20 billion in securities linked to various mortgage instruments. His career took off as that figure surged to over £180 billion by 2008, when Mr. Ishikawa secured for himself a $3 million bonus from Morgan Stanley as a reward for peddling assets that turned out to be toxic. With that line of business virtually defunct, banks in the coming years must return to lower-risk and lower-return businesses like equity and bond underwriting, foreign exchange trading and traditional deal-making — businesses that may well be profitable, but can in no way make up for the loss of such a lush specialty. The Center for Economic and Business Research estimates that corporate and income taxes from the financial industry will shrink from 12 percent of the overall tax take in 2007 to 8 percent this year and perhaps lower in the years ahead, a prospect that could force Britain to increase its already substantial borrowing requirement. The crisis has humbled all financial centers, from Wall Street to Dubai. According to an index produced in Britain that ranks financial centers around the world, the City of London still comes out on top, closely followed by New York. The gap, though, between these two and Singapore, which is now third, is narrowing. Lord Adair Turner, the chairman of the Financial Services Authority, agrees that London as a financial center will be in for an adjustment and says that a large portion of the banking industry’s profit contribution to the economy was “illusory.” But even in a more restrictive environment, he points out, London’s importance as a global financial hub and the most valuable trading center in Europe will not go away. “The City is important today for the same reason it was important in 1890,” he said. As for Mr. Ishikawa, who is 30 and grew up in Britain as the son of a successful Japanese executive, he is putting his hopes into a new career as a writer. His book, “How I Caused the Credit Crunch,” chronicles the debauched excesses of the boom — he was briefly married to a Brazilian lap dancer — by lightly fictionalizing his six-year stint in finance. “I really don’t miss it,” he said, sipping a coffee near the building where he was laid off. “There are many more kids out there more hungry than me.” Like Faruq Rana, for example. Mr. Rana, the 26-year-old son of Bangladeshi immigrants, was born and reared in Tower Hamlets, a district abutting Canary Wharf that has Britain’s highest unemployment rate. From his window, he can see the towers of Citigroup and Barclays reaching into the sky and his ambition to one day work as a trader in one of those buildings soars nearly as high. “Every day when I wake up and open up my window, I can smell my job,” said Mr. Rana, who is a student in a government-financed program at Tower Hamlets College that prepares local youths for jobs in the financial industry. Unlike Mr. Ishikawa, Mr. Rana did not go to Eton or Oxford, but he remains undeterred. “I have the motivation and the drive,” he said. “I think I can be one of them.” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/business/global/29city.html?ref=global-home
  24. La firme britannique Framestore, spécialisée dans les effets spéciaux pour le cinéma et la publicité, a confirmé lundi son implantation à Montréal, ce qui devrait créer 200 emplois d'ici la fin de l'année. La première ministre Pauline Marois, en mission au Royaume-Uni, a participé à l'annonce officielle en compagnie du PDG de Framestore, William Sargent, au siège social de l'entreprise, à Londres. Le gouvernement consentira un prêt sans intérêt de 900 000 $ étalé sur cinq ans, ce qui lui coûtera environ 35 000 $ par année. En conférence de presse, Mme Marois a soutenu qu'aucun crédit d'impôt n'allait être accordé au projet, mais il en est tout autrement. Les clients de Framestore, principalement les grands studios de cinéma de Hollywood, auront droit à des avantages fiscaux pouvant représenter jusqu'à 44% de toutes les dépenses effectuées à Montréal et jusqu'à 60% en incluant le crédit d'impôt fédéral. M. Sargent a d'ailleurs expliqué que l'une des deux raisons pour lesquelles Framestore a choisi Montréal, c'est l'existence des généreux crédits d'Impôt, l'autre étant le bassin de main d'oeuvre qualifiée qu'on trouve dans la métropole québécoise. Vive concurrence Montréal était notamment en concurrence avec Toronto, Vancouver et des villes asiatiques pour obtenir le studio. À l'heure actuelle, l'industrie canadienne des effets spéciaux est concentrée à Vancouver. Québec espère que l'arrivée de Framestore à incitera d'autres entreprises du secteur à s'y établir également. Les premières productions auxquelles travailleront les artisans de Montréal, et ce dès le mois de mars, sont RoboCop (Columbia Pictures et MGM), et All You Need Is Kill (Warner Brothers), qui doivent tous deux sortir en 2014. Framestore compte trois studios à Londres, un à New York et un à Los Angeles, où travaillent environ 700 personnes. Si tout va comme prévu, le studio de Montréal sera le plus important de l'entreprise à l'extérieur de Londres d'ici la fin de l'année. Pauline Marois s'est également rendue lundi matin au Foreign & Commonwealth Office pour rencontrer le ministre délégué responsable de l'Amérique du Nord pour le Royaume-Uni, Alistair Burt. Sur l'heure du midi, elle prononcera un discours devant la Chambre de commerce Canada-Royaume-Uni auquel assistera notamment l'ancien premier ministre de Colombie-Britannique, Gordon Campbell, qui est maintenant haut-commissaire du Canada à Londres. http://www.lesaffaires.com/techno/technologies-et-telecommunications/cinema-framestore-creera-200-emplois-a-montreal/553618
  25. Wall Street, R.I.P.: The End of an Era, Even at Goldman Article Tools Sponsored By By JULIE CRESWELL and BEN WHITE Published: September 27, 2008 WALL STREET. Two simple words that — like Hollywood and Washington — conjure a world. Goldman Sachs’s headquarters in New York. The company, a golden child of the financial sector, faces a very different future and mission amid seismic changes wrought by the credit crisis. Lloyd C. Blankfein led Goldman’s securities division before becoming chief executive in 2006. A world of big egos. A world where people love to roll the dice with borrowed money. A world of tightwire trading, propelled by computers. In search of ever-higher returns — and larger yachts, faster cars and pricier art collections for their top executives — Wall Street firms bulked up their trading desks and hired pointy-headed quantum physicists to develop foolproof programs. Hedge funds placed markers on red (the Danish krone goes up) or black (the G.D.P. of Thailand falls). And private equity firms amassed giant funds and went on a shopping spree, snapping up companies as if they were second wives buying Jimmy Choo shoes on sale. That world is largely coming to an end. The huge bailout package being debated in Congress may succeed in stabilizing the financial markets. But it is too late to help firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, which have already disappeared. Merrill Lynch, whose trademark bull symbolized Wall Street to many Americans, is being folded into Bank of America, located hundreds of miles from New York, in Charlotte, N.C. For most of the financiers who remain, with the exception of a few superstars, the days of easy money and supersized bonuses are behind them. The credit boom that drove Wall Street’s explosive growth has dried up. Regulators who sat on the sidelines for too long are now eager to rein in Wall Street’s bad boys and the practices that proliferated in recent years. “The swashbuckling days of Wall Street firms’ trading, essentially turning themselves into giant hedge funds, are over. Turns out they weren’t that good,” said Andrew Kessler, a former hedge fund manager. “You’re no longer going to see middle-level folks pulling in seven- and multiple-seven-dollar figures that no one can figure out exactly what they did for that.” The beginning of the end is felt even in the halls of the white-shoe firm Goldman Sachs, which, among its Wall Street peers, epitomized and defined a high-risk, high-return culture. Goldman is the firm that other Wall Street firms love to hate. It houses some of the world’s biggest private equity and hedge funds. Its investment bankers are the smartest. Its traders, the best. They make the most money on Wall Street, earning the firm the nickname Goldmine Sachs. (Its 30,522 employees earned an average of $600,000 last year — an average that considers secretaries as well as traders.) Although executives at other firms secretly hoped that Goldman would once — just once — make a big mistake, at the same time, they tried their darnedest to emulate it. While Goldman remains top-notch in providing merger advice and underwriting public offerings, what it does better than any other firm on Wall Street is proprietary trading. That involves using its own funds, as well as a heap of borrowed money, to make big, smart global bets. Other firms tried to follow its lead, heaping risk on top of risk, all trying to capture just a touch of Goldman’s magic dust and its stellar quarter-after-quarter returns. Not one ever came close. While the credit crisis swamped Wall Street over the last year, causing Merrill, Citigroup and Lehman Brothers to sustain heavy losses on big bets in mortgage-related securities, Goldman sailed through with relatively minor bumps. In 2007, the same year that Citigroup and Merrill cast out their chief executives, Goldman booked record revenue and earnings and paid its chief, Lloyd C. Blankfein, $68.7 million — the most ever for a Wall Street C.E.O. Even Wall Street’s golden child, Goldman, however, could not withstand the turmoil that rocked the financial system in recent weeks. After Lehman and the American International Group were upended, and Merrill jumped into its hastily arranged engagement with Bank of America two weeks ago, Goldman’s stock hit a wall. The A.I.G. debacle was particularly troubling. Goldman was A.I.G.’s largest trading partner, according to several people close to A.I.G. who requested anonymity because of confidentiality agreements. Goldman assured investors that its exposure to A.I.G. was immaterial, but jittery investors and clients pulled out of the firm, nervous that stand-alone investment banks — even one as esteemed as Goldman — might not survive. “What happened confirmed my feeling that Goldman Sachs, no matter how good it was, was not impervious to the fortunes of fate,” said John H. Gutfreund, the former chief executive of Salomon Brothers. So, last weekend, with few choices left, Goldman Sachs swallowed a bitter pill and turned itself into, of all things, something rather plain and pedestrian: a deposit-taking bank. The move doesn’t mean that Goldman is going to give away free toasters for opening a checking account at a branch in Wichita anytime soon. But the shift is an assault on Goldman’s culture and the core of its astounding returns of recent years. Not everyone thinks that the Goldman money machine is going to be entirely constrained. Last week, the Oracle of Omaha, Warren E. Buffett, made a $5 billion investment in the firm, and Goldman raised another $5 billion in a separate stock offering. Still, many people say, with such sweeping changes before it, Goldman Sachs could well be losing what made it so special. But, then again, few things on Wall Street will be the same. GOLDMAN’S latest golden era can be traced to the rise of Mr. Blankfein, the Brooklyn-born trading genius who took the helm in June 2006, when Henry M. Paulson Jr., a veteran investment banker and adviser to many of the world’s biggest companies, left the bank to become the nation’s Treasury secretary. Mr. Blankfein’s ascent was a significant changing of the guard at Goldman, with the vaunted investment banking division giving way to traders who had become increasingly responsible for driving a run of eye-popping profits. Before taking over as chief executive, Mr. Blankfein led Goldman’s securities division, pushing a strategy that increasingly put the bank’s own capital on the line to make big trading bets and investments in businesses as varied as power plants and Japanese banks. The shift in Goldman’s revenue shows the transformation of the bank. From 1996 to 1998, investment banking generated up to 40 percent of the money Goldman brought in the door. In 2007, Goldman’s best year, that figure was less than 16 percent, while revenue from trading and principal investing was 68 percent. Goldman’s ability to sidestep the worst of the credit crisis came mainly because of its roots as a private partnership in which senior executives stood to lose their shirts if the bank faltered. Founded in 1869, Goldman officially went public in 1999 but never lost the flat structure that kept lines of communication open among different divisions. In late 2006, when losses began showing in one of Goldman’s mortgage trading accounts, the bank held a top-level meeting where executives including David Viniar, the chief financial officer, concluded that the housing market was headed for a significant downturn. Hedging strategies were put in place that essentially amounted to a bet that housing prices would fall. When they did, Goldman limited its losses while rivals posted ever-bigger write-downs on mortgages and complex securities tied to them. In 2007, Goldman generated $11.6 billion in profit, the most money an investment bank has ever made in a year, and avoided most of the big mortgage-related losses that began slamming other banks late in that year. Goldman’s share price soared to a record of $247.92 on Oct. 31. Goldman continued to outpace its rivals into this year, though profits declined significantly as the credit crisis worsened and trading conditions became treacherous. Still, even as Bear Stearns collapsed in March over bad mortgage bets and Lehman was battered, few thought that the untouchable Goldman could ever falter. Mr. Blankfein, an inveterate worrier, beefed up his books in part by stashing more than $100 billion in cash and short-term, highly liquid securities in an account at the Bank of New York. The Bony Box, as Mr. Blankfein calls it, was created to make sure that Goldman could keep doing business even in the face of market eruptions. That strong balance sheet, and Goldman’s ability to avoid losses during the crisis, appeared to leave the bank in a strong position to move through the industry upheaval with its trading-heavy business model intact, if temporarily dormant. Even as some analysts suggested that Goldman should consider buying a commercial bank to diversify, executives including Mr. Blankfein remained cool to the notion. Becoming a deposit-taking bank would just invite more regulation and lessen its ability to shift capital quickly in volatile markets, the thinking went. All of that changed two weeks ago when shares of Goldman and its chief rival, Morgan Stanley, went into free fall. A national panic over the mortgage crisis deepened and investors became increasingly convinced that no stand-alone investment bank would survive, even with the government’s plan to buy up toxic assets. Nervous hedge funds, some burned by losing big money when Lehman went bust, began moving some of their balances away from Goldman to bigger banks, like JPMorgan Chase and Deutsche Bank. By the weekend, it was clear that Goldman’s options were to either merge with another company or transform itself into a deposit-taking bank holding company. So Goldman did what it has always done in the face of rapidly changing events: it turned on a dime. “They change to fit their environment. When it was good to go public, they went public,” said Michael Mayo, banking analyst at Deutsche Bank. “When it was good to get big in fixed income, they got big in fixed income. When it was good to get into emerging markets, they got into emerging markets. Now that it’s good to be a bank, they became a bank.” The moment it changed its status, Goldman became the fourth-largest bank holding company in the United States, with $20 billion in customer deposits spread between a bank subsidiary it already owned in Utah and its European bank. Goldman said it would quickly move more assets, including its existing loan business, to give the bank $150 billion in deposits. Even as Goldman was preparing to radically alter its structure, it was also negotiating with Mr. Buffett, a longtime client, on the terms of his $5 billion cash infusion. Mr. Buffett, as he always does, drove a relentless bargain, securing a guaranteed annual dividend of $500 million and the right to buy $5 billion more in Goldman shares at a below-market price. While the price tag for his blessing was steep, the impact was priceless. “Buffett got a very good deal, which means the guy on the other side did not get as good a deal,” said Jonathan Vyorst, a portfolio manager at the Paradigm Value Fund. “But from Goldman’s perspective, it is reputational capital that is unparalleled.” EVEN if the bailout stabilizes the markets, Wall Street won’t go back to its freewheeling, profit-spinning ways of old. After years of lax regulation, Wall Street firms will face much stronger oversight by regulators who are looking to tighten the reins on many practices that allowed the Street to flourish. For Goldman and Morgan Stanley, which are converting themselves into bank holding companies, that means their primary regulators become the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which oversee banking institutions. Rather than periodic audits by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Goldman will have regulators on site and looking over their shoulders all the time. The banking giant JPMorgan Chase, for instance, has 70 regulators from the Federal Reserve and the comptroller’s agency in its offices every day. Those regulators have open access to its books, trading floors and back-office operations. (That’s not to say stronger regulators would prevent losses. Citigroup, which on paper is highly regulated, suffered huge write-downs on risky mortgage securities bets.) As a bank, Goldman will also face tougher requirements about the size of the financial cushion it maintains. While Goldman and Morgan Stanley both meet current guidelines, many analysts argue that regulators, as part of the fallout from the credit crisis, may increase the amount of capital banks must have on hand. More important, a stiffer regulatory regime across Wall Street is likely to reduce the use and abuse of its favorite addictive drug: leverage. The low-interest-rate environment of the last decade offered buckets of cheap credit. Just as consumers maxed out their credit cards to live beyond their means, Wall Street firms bolstered their returns by pumping that cheap credit into their own trading operations and lending money to hedge funds and private equity firms so they could do the same. By using leverage, or borrowed funds, firms like Goldman Sachs easily increased the size of the bets they were making in their own trading portfolios. If they were right — and Goldman typically was — the returns were huge. When things went wrong, however, all of that debt turned into a nightmare. When Bear Stearns was on the verge of collapse, it had borrowed $33 for every $1 of equity it held. When trading partners that had lent Bear the money began demanding it back, the firm’s coffers ran dangerously low. Earlier this year, Goldman had borrowed about $28 for every $1 in equity. In the ensuing credit crisis, Wall Street firms have reined in their borrowing significantly and have lent less money to hedge funds and private equity firms. Today, Goldman’s borrowings stand at about $20 to $1, but even that is likely to come down. Banks like JPMorgan and Citigroup typically borrow about $10 to $1, analysts say. As leverage dries up across Wall Street, so will the outsize returns at many private equity firms and hedge funds. Returns at many hedge funds are expected to be awful this year because of a combination of bad bets and an inability to borrow. One result could be a landslide of hedge funds’ closing shop. At Goldman, the reduced use of borrowed money for its own trading operations means that its earnings will also decrease, analysts warn. Brad Hintz, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Company, predicts that Goldman’s return on equity, a common measure of how efficiently capital is invested, will fall to 13 percent this year, from 33 percent in 2007, and hover around 14 percent or 15 percent for the next few years. Goldman says its returns are primarily driven by economic growth, its market share and pricing power, not by leverage. It adds that it does not expect changes in its business strategies and expects a 20 percent return on equity in the future. IF Mr. Hintz is right, and Goldman’s legendary returns decline, so will its paychecks. Without those multimillion-dollar paydays, those top-notch investment bankers, elite traders and private-equity superstars may well stroll out the door and try their luck at starting small, boutique investment-banking firms or hedge funds — if they can. “Over time, the smart people will migrate out of the firm because commercial banks don’t pay out 50 percent of their revenues as compensation,” said Christopher Whalen, a managing partner at Institutional Risk Analytics. “Banks simply aren’t that profitable.” As the game of musical chairs continues on Wall Street, with banks like JPMorgan scooping up troubled competitors like Washington Mutual, some analysts are wondering what Goldman’s next move will be. Goldman is unlikely to join with a commercial bank with a broad retail network, because a plain-vanilla consumer business is costly to operate and is the polar opposite of Goldman’s rarefied culture. “If they go too far afield or get too large in terms of personnel, then they become Citigroup, with the corporate bureaucracy and slowness and the inability to make consensus-type decisions that come with that,” Mr. Hintz said. A better fit for Goldman would be a bank that caters to corporations and other institutions, like Northern Trust or State Street Bank, he said. “I don’t think they’re going to move too fast, no matter what the environment on Wall Street is,” Mr. Hintz said. “They’re going to take some time and consider what exactly the new Goldman Sachs is going to be.”